Emergence 3: Emergence and Collapse

The Oil Drum ran a post last week discussing complexity and collapse which briefly touched on the notion of emergence.  I think it's illustrative of the failure of theories of social complexity to address emergence, and to distinguish between strong and weak emergence.

I am increasingly of the opinion that the crux of understanding the behavior of social complexity is understanding emergence--both what it is, how it works, and what actions are available re: emergence. My first two posts in this series address the nature of emergence and the difference between weak and strong emergence.  In short, there may be two very distinct types of phenomena labled "emergence":
1. Weak emergence: these are systemic phenomena that are theoretically reducible, but not practically reducible due to complexity. Most complexity theory (e.g. modeling, simulation, system laws, etc.) study this form of emergence without noting the differentiation with:
2. Strong emergence: these are systemic phenomena that are fundamentally not reducible, but that are ontologically distinct and can exert downward causation on the system from which they emerge. A possible example is consciousness (though the theoretical problem with strong emergence is that, until we understand *how* it works, we can't rule out that we just haven't yet learned how it is reducible--e.g. what were once viewed as emergent properties of elements seen in the periodic table now appear to be reducible to quantum mechanics). Complexity studies, for the most part, ignore strong emergence, or fail to differentiate strong vs. weak.
Why is this relevant to the question of complexity in civilization and the question of collapse? I think there is an important interface between emergence and the collapse of complex societies as noted by Joseph Tainter and others.  Viz., that one evolutionary strategy for managing complexity is hierarchy, this is the strategy that has dominated human history because it allows centralized control over the complexity, but it also tends to result in collapse because hierarchies are structurally driven to growth and intensification. In contrast, complexity can be managed by the system via emergence, but this removes control from the center. One function of intensification of [hierarchal] complexity is to deal with information management and coordination. However, if consciousness is a guide, this may also be possible via (strong?) emergence in a decentralized system rather than via hierarchy. Such systems could manage complexity, could optimize functioning over time, but without intensification, therefore removing the driver of collapse. Compare, for example, the information processing and coordination function of hierarchal systems with something analagous to "synchronicity" as a strongly emergent coordinating and information processing phenoemenon. The role--and more importantly potential future role--of strong emergence in human systems has been almost entirely ignored.

Any general law of complexity, and any attempt to apply complexity theory to social systems must address emergence directly, and in my view must specifically address the distinction between weak and strong emergence.  I think that current writing on complexity theory, especially as it applies complexity theory to civilization, almost entirely fails to consider the role and impact of these key features.  My writing going forward with this series will be an attempt to address that gap.  Unfortunately, while I hope to continue some kind of posting for the next three weeks, anything requiring more than about 15 minutes effort is unlikely before March 15th...

Emergence 2: Weak vs. Strong Emergence

Modern study of emergence tends to separate "emergence" into two broad categories:  weak emergence and strong emergence.  This distinction is made by Mark Bedau, among other commentators.  The differences between the two species of emergence are significant.

Strong emergence:  This is the species of emergent discussed in the first post in this series--an emergence that is ontologically separate from its microstructure, not derivable from that microstructure, and capable of exerting downward causation on the functioning of that microstructure.

Weak emergence:  Weak emergence is the set of phenomena that is theoretically reducible to the known laws governing the microstructure, but where the calculations required to predict the resulting phenomena are so complex as to be effectively impossible.  Instead, with weak emergence, these calculations are carried out by means of simulation.

This study of weak emergence, also called more broadly the study of complexity, is seen in the (overlapping) modern disciplines of systems theory, neural networks theory, dynamical systems theory, agent based modeling, complex adaptive systems, etc.  One of my favorite authors, John Holland ("Hidden Order" and "Emergence") discusses this form of emergence.

The study of strong emergence has been less fruitful, so far, in science, perhaps because like weak emergence, it is not practicably reducible, but unlike weak emergence, it is also (so far) not capable of simulation.  Strong emergence--as is pointed out by many of its critics--is primarily either a subject of philosophical discourse or it is narrowly useful as a theory of human consciousness that really hasn't changed much since Roger Sperry's groundbreaking theory of consciousness in 1969.

For this blog, and the theory of Rhizome, are we interested in the effects of weak or strong emergence?  In my mind, the answer is clearly "both."  There is little doubt that human systems, evolving civilization, group dynamics, and economic dynamics exhibit weakly emergent traits.  The study of weak emergence, therefore, will likely give us insight into the operation of these systems, how to shape them, and the viability of alternative structures.  My theory of Rhizome communication, for example, and its information processing and economic coordination capability, can be compared to the capabilities of more hierarchal structures by way of simulation.  The functioning of these various structures are fundamentally reducible to known and understood interaction of their microstructure, but the resulting calculations are simply not feasible, and therefore the study of weak emergence may offer useful insights into their functioning.  I am also, however, interested in the potential strong emergence in human civilization.  Even if strong emergence exists nowhere but human consciousness, that alone is interesting enough to warrant further exploration--at a minimum, there is the question of whether a "weakly emergent" phenomena like human civilization and economics can be meaningfully separated from the strongly emergent consciousness present at each individual human component in the microstructure...

Intuitively, however, I think there is a good chance that strong emergence plays a much more significant role beyond human consciousness--in group dynamics, communication, cultural trends, and economic coordination.  This is where I think emergence has something fundamentally new and valuable to teach us--beyond what we can learn from studying complex human systems through the lens of weak emergence.  What exactly this influence of strong emergence is I do not know--one reason I find this so fascinating is that it is a possibility that is simply not being studied or considered.  The possibilities seem endless.  I do, however, have a theory, specifically pertaining to the influence of strong emergence on coordination and information processing.

My theory is that, just like human consciousness (which I presume to be strongly emergent) offers superior coordination and information processing capabilities when compared to non-strongly emergent coordination and information processing (such as computers), I think that strongly emergent phenomena in economic coordination, dynamic network structuring, and human communication may dramatically increase the efficiency of operation of human systems that foster strong emergence.  Such strong emergence may be present to varying degrees in our current economic and political systems, but my hunch is that structures designed to better foster strong emergence would leverage these effects to a much greater degree.  Specifically, as I hinted at in the first post in this series, decentralized but well connected networks (e.g. Rhizome) that mimic the connectivity of the human brain may, like the human brain, foster strong emergence.  Hierarchy, on the other hand, may actually act to dampen strong emergence--in fact, one of the main evolutionary features of hierarchy in human civilization may be that, by dampening strong emergence, system control is maintained at the top of the hierarchy, rather than ceded to some degree to a strongly emergent and ontologically distinct phenomenon.  These ideas are, of course, still very fuzzy, difficult to articulate, and poorly supported, but the potential here makes them worthy of further investigation in my opinion.

While strong emergence may not be subject to study by simulation, as weak emergence is, I think it may be replicable.  That is, if we accept that strong emergence is derivative of an underlying microstructure, then by replicating that microstructure, or at least the salient features of that microstructure, it may be possible to foster strongly emergent phenomena.  This has always been an influence in the theory of Rhizome--largely unstated until now because I haven't had the tools to explain why this was anything more than intuition and speculation on my part.  While I think Rhizome, as a theory, is valid even if there is nothing more than weak emergence in this world, the potential to leverage strong emergence may make the theory even more robust.

Emergence 1: Fundamentals

I've been promising a series on emergence--the science behind it and what it potentially means for human civilization and spirituality--for some time.  I wrote two posts on the topic (and promised to post them) but later decided that I needed to first improve my own understanding of this topic before offering any thoughts or conclusions to a broader audience.  I'm now well in to that process (at the result of understanding now, more than ever, just how much about emergence remains unknown).  With two caveats, I'm beginning my series on emergence--a topic that I think is central to the ongoing evolution of economics, politics, science, spirituality, and my own theory of Rhizome.  The first caveat is that I continue to read and think about emergence--this series is by no means a simple presentation of ultimate conclusions.  It is the chronicle of my process of learning about emergence, and my thoughts on the topic along the way.  The second caveat is that, while I continue to work to publish a new post every Monday morning, I'm not optimistic about my ability to keep precisely to that schedule over the next few weeks.  I have an 8-day jury trial starting March 1st.  My preparation will be fairly intense--I'll be taking or defending three all-day expert depositions over the next 8 days alone--and at some point this writing will have to take a back seat.

That said, what's the big deal about emergence, anyway?  The scientific community is primarily interested in emergence as a phenomenon present in psychology--specifically the study of human consciousness.  Consciousness, along with developmental microbiology, occupy in my mind the top tier of the pantheon of great unknowns (I think theological unknowns will be largely answered if and when we fully understand these two sets of phenomena).  As will become more clear after discussing the fundamentals of emergence, however, it is my hypothesis that human political and economic organization may be linked to the same set of macro-rules that govern both consciousness and developmental microbiology--something that I think could be a great accelerant to my theory of Rhizome, though not necessarily an essential element.  That's why, aside from general intellectual curiosity about the "great unknowns," I think a discussion of emergence is relevant here.

British Emergentism and Configurational Forces

Where else to start but the beginning?  While I (borrowing from others) have in the past suggested that emergence was a new field, it is anything but.  It certainly stems back as far as Aristotle, though it has been part of the mainstream intellectual discourse since at least the late Nineteenth Century in a school called "British Emergentism."  The British Emergentists hypothesized the notion of "configurational force," which is "that of a force that can be exerted only by substances with certain types of structures, where the forces are such that they canno be exerted by any kinds of pairs of elementary particles."  The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism, Brian P. McLaughlin, at 1.4.  This theory basically suggested that effects then mysterious such as physical chemistry, atomic bonding, etc., were not the result of "micro-structural" forces (the characteristics of the individual atoms bonding, for example), but rather their structure.  Subsequent developments, especially in the field of quantum mechanics, pretty much took the wind out of the sails of the British Emergentists, but their several decades of prominence (roughly 1880-1930) laid much of the ontological groundwork for modern discussions of emergence.

What is Emergence?

It's often defined as the situation where a phnomenon is "unexplainable, or unpredictable, on the basis of information concerning the spatial parts or other constiutents of the system in which the phenomenon occurs." On the Idea of Emergence, C. Hempel and P. Oppenheim.  In other words, even if you know everything about the "micro-structure" of the components of a system, you cannot explain or predict observable phenomena (emergents) of that system.  Consciousness is  perfect example--given everything we know about neurology, chemistry, biology, etc., we still cannot predict or explain consciousness.  It is an emergent--a property of the system that emerges from the whole but that (at present) cannot be explained or predicted based on an understanding of its component parts.

Some have suggested that emergence is only a way of stating that we do not yet have sufficient understanding of the micro-structure of a system to predict the emergent phenomenon, and that this fact alone in no way proves that there is anything "emergent" about the as-of-yet unexplained phenomena--they merely represent an expression of our current limits of knowledge.  The demise of British Emergentism as a theory to explain certain aspects of chemistry supports this view--the improved understanding of micro-structure via quantum mechanics made once unexplained and unpredictable phenomena fully explained and predictable.  However, the fact that some emergent phenomena may be reducible to an improved microstructure theory does not prove that emergence is not also a stand-alone phenomenon.  "Emergence" of a characteristic is not an ontological trait of certain phenomena--all or some may be ultimately reducible--but it is a means of explaining what cannot currently be explained through reductionism. 

As unsatisfying as that admission may be, it has potentially critical ramifications:  if an "Emergent" (an irredudible phenomena that emerges from a broader system) is fundamentally unreducible, then several interesting results follow (discussed below).  If, however, a phenomena later proves to be reducible, then its ontological value is significantly changed.  Take consciousness, for example.  If consciousness is an emergent--that is, it can never be reduced to mere operation of component neurons, etc.--then that tells us something very significant about the human condition, both scientifically and theologically.  However, if we eventually learn that consciousness is fully explainable and predictable based on its micro-structure of neurons, then any discussion of "soul" or "individual" seem to end, at least in my mind.  If people have personalities for the same ultimate reason that leaves are green (i.e. in both cases, if the result is completely reducible to and explainable by the micro-structure), then there is nothing fundamentally unique about two people beyond that which is unique between two leaves.  If, however, consciousness is an emergent (unreducible to microstrucutre, unexplainable and unpredictable based on that microstructure), then we are left with significant mystery, but also significant understanding--specifically, that there is some part of humanity that, by definition, transcends our bodies.

Hierarchy and Emergence

It seems, however, that emergence informs far more than theology.  The identification of an emergent is not the end of the investigation--far from it.  First, an emergent cannot be "identified" any more than we can prove a negative--investigation into possible microstructural causes must continue as the ability to conduct those investigations improves.  However, an equally interesting any revealing question presents itself:  even if an emergent isn't explainable or predictable by the microstructure, can we understand what microstructures give rise to (or tend to give rise to) emergents?  One core idea of our modern understanding of emergence is that "as systems acquire increasingly higher degrees of organizational complexity they begin to exhibit novel properties that in some sense transcend the properties of their constituent parts, and behave in ways that cannot be predicted on the basis of the laws governing simple systms."  Making Sense of Emergence, Jaegwon Kim.

In other words:  as complexity increases, at some point emergent properties of the complex system seem to present themselves.  This process will be the focus of my discussion in later posts, but for now I want to pose a hypothesis:  some kinds of complexity are more conducive to generating emergence than others.  That sounds pretty simple, but consider the importance of a possible extension of this:  non-hierarchal (topologically "flat") complexity is more conducive to emergence than is hierarchal complexity.  I think there is support for this from one of the key examples of emergence listed above:  consciousness, which emerges (presumably) from the very non-hierarchal structure of our brains.  Compare this to the massive but hierarchal corporate structures in our economy which do not appear to exhibit emergence (and, conversely, the far less hierarchal global structure of human interactions which, may hypothesize, facilitates the emergence of the noosphere, or "global brain").  Can we foster, or guide emergence from human strucutres?  Is hierarchy an evolutionary mechanism to control (reduce/eliminate) emergence in human political or economic systems?  Why would it matter?  Specifically, what could be the effect of emergence that would make it relevant to the structure or functioning of our economic or political systems?

Emergents and Downward Causation

At the cutting edge, and among the more controversial parts of emergence theory, is the notion that "emergents bring into the world new causal powers of their own, and, in particular, theat they have the powers to influence and control the direction of the lower-level processes from which they emerge."  Making Sense of Emergence, Jaegwon Kim.  This notion of "downward causation" is critical.  If emergents cannot exercise downward causation, then the emergent is either (1) nothing more than an as-of-yet unexplained but reducible phenomenon, or (2) useless as an ontological formulation (because what does it do or tell us?).  As Jaegkown Kim asks, "For what purpose would it serve to insist on the existence of emergent properties if they were mere epiphenomena with no causal or explanatory relevance . . . [if emergence] supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do, no purpose to serve, a species of noblesse w hich depends on the work of its inferiors, but is kept for show and might as well, and undoubtedly would in time be abolished."

The controversy over downward causation seems to stem from the mental gymnastics demanded by a feature that emerges from itself while simultaneously influencing the sourced of its genesis--what some have suggested is an unacceptable circularity.  I don't have any problem in principle with this formulation, but proponents have also developed a modification of the theory of emegence that seems to satsify even the skepitics:  diachronic reflexive emergence, or emergence where the emergent at time T influences the micro-structure at T+1, which in turn results in possible modification of the emergent at T+2, etc.

Certainly, if one accepts consciousness to be an emergent, then the downward causation of consciousness (acting upon the physical body and brain structure) is clearly documented (this specific example matches the model of diachronic reflexive emergence mentioned above).

There you have it--a whirlwind tour of the fundamentals of emergence as both a philosophical and scientific doctrine.  We're just scratching the surface (though human understanding doesn't seem to go much deeper at this point).  To whet your appetite for future discussions:  can different human economic or political configurations exhibit different abilities to produce emergents, and can those emergents in turn exert downward causation on the operation of the underlying structure?  Can we structure our economic or political systems in a way that facilitates emergents--even emergents that then open the door to new functioning of the underlying political or economic system through the exercise of downward emergence?  Is this playing with fire?  (Or, perhaps more appropriately, playing god?)

Rhizome is published every Monday morning.  Subscribe to this blog's feed:  http://www.jeffvail.net/rss.xml

Cabinda Update

Two and a half years ago, I wrote an article about the potential for unrest and insurgency in Cabinda, an oil-rich exclave of Angola, to disrupt projected increases in Angolan oil production.  This week, Cabinda again made the news with a deadly attack on the visiting Togolese football (soccer) team.  What is the current situation in Cabinda, and more importantly what does this tell us about the state of oil and infrastructure targeting by insurgents?

There aren't enough data points to say anything definitive on Cabinda, but it appears that the various insurgent factions operating there have not been able to effectively leverage threats against offshore oil production to advance their cause(s).  I think there are three issues here worth discussing. 

First, as noted in the article on the recent attack, above, there appears to be in-fighting among the various rebel groups, with more than one claiming responsibility for the recent attack.  To me, this suggests that the character of the insurrection remains predominantly hierarchal, as opposed to an open-source "fuoco."  This is inhibiting the success of Cabinda's insurgents, and more importantly (see below) preventing them from effectively leveraging open-source models of targeting and tactics development.

Second, while it's unclear whether this is a chicken or egg issue, the rebel groups in Cabinda have not demonstrated the ability to learn from insurgencies around the world about the effectiveness of targeting infrastructure (especially oil export capability) to gain leverage.  If the insurgents in Cabinda could present the plausible threat of taking a significant portion of Angola's oil export capacity off-line, they would have a very powerful bargaining chip toward increased autonomy and profit sharing.

Third, rebel groups in Cabinda have not shown the ability to learn from global insurgencies (especially Nigeria) the tactical ability to effectively target offshore platforms and offshore oil production and export capabilities.  The opportunity to learn and develop a locally-appropriate tactical set is there, but requires 1) understanding the targeting methodology involved (see above) and 2) open-source (as opposed to infighting among hierarchal structures) development of this capability.

Cabinda's insurgent groups are failing ot seize this critical opportunity, and their window of opportunity to exert leverage on Angola via threats to its oil export potential will not last forever (another decade, roughly).  It's an interesting case study, in my mind, because it shows both that integration of the open-source insurgency model is not automatic, and because it shows some of the features (in-fighting among locally-powerful/influential figures) that can dampen the development of an open-source insurgency.

"Eco-Nationalism," Identity Politics, and Sustainability

I recently had the interesting experience of discussing Rhizome with a self-professed "eco-fascist"--not someone, as you might at first think, who is interested in a strong central government to ensure that humans don't damage the environment, but rather someone trying to apply green wrapping paper to what is admittedly a "white nationalist" agenda.

As I explained as patiently as I could, combining white nationalism (or "majority rights" or "eurasianism," among other euphemisms these groups like to use) with "eco" or other trappings of an environmentally-friendly agenda is internally contradictory.  I decided not to embark on the futile task of convincing this man of the general error of his ways, but only to illustrate the fundamental incompatibility of ultra-nationalism and any claim to sustainability.

After more thought, however, I realized that this fundamental infirmity extends to more than just white nationalism, but to all identity politics are fundamentally unsustainable.  Look around--identity politics is deeply entrenched, indeed.

All identity politics presume hierarchy.  Without a hierarchal power structure, there is no ability to enforce the definition of "in-group" vs. "out-group" and the concomitant preferential treatment of the in-group.  It simply won't do, for example, for white nationalists to have the Italians, or heaven forbid the Jews, to presume that they qualify as "white"!  This same hierarchy that enforces the group definition, however, necessarily produces peer-polity competition between it and other such hierarchies (because the "out-groups" will form their own "in-groups" in response--creating competing hierarchies), and these groups must then grow and intensify to avoid being out-competed (or, in ultra-nationalist terms, "out-bred").  This is the Problem of Growth, and reveals as false any claim of sustainability by these identity groups.

So, if identity politics are necessarily unsustainable, does that relegate us all to a formless, tasteless, meaningless future?  Far from it!  The only incompatibility between those qualities and characteristics that make humanity vibrant and meaningful with sustainability is when people seek to use abstractions of of purportedly intrinsic characteristics and qualities to divide or exclude on the basis of differences.  Instead, networks are more efficient where they embrace these differences without seeking to impose uniformity (the multitude), leveraging the differences in perspective, understanding, and connections.  In some senses this may sound like standard multiculturalism, but it incorporates the important difference of the rejection of hierarchy either within this multitude or as a means to define this multitude.

Examples of the strength of such a multitude can already be seen today in the dominance in intellectual and cultural creativity of such diverse locations as London, New York, and San Francisco.  Of course, even these networks are hindered by their simultaneous integration of extreme hierarchy.  In fact, while the metropolis exhibits many of the strengths of the multitude (as highlighted by Hardt and Negri in their recent work Commonwealth), their fixedness to cartesian notions of space result in equally extreme dependencies (e.g. food, water, shelter, etc.) that create extremely hierarchal structures.  The information processing burden of these hierarchies significantly dampens the synergies of the multitude, and is precisely why I think that Rhizome, as a less geographically centralized alternative, can develop the scale-free self sufficiency to allow it to leverage the pure powers of such multiplicity through optimal network configurations without the burdens of hierarchy.

None of this will likely convince the white nationalists, whose heavily negative first (oral/survival) and second (anal/territorial) circuit imprints make them susceptible to ideas that let them think they are OK because others aren't (to put it in Robert Anton Wilson's terminology).  However, I think it is important for us to realize that this structural unsustainability extends well beyond such facially objectionable ideologies...

Rhizome is published every Monday morning.  You can subscribe to this blog's RSS feed at:  http://www.jeffvail.net/rss.xml

2010 - Predictions and Catabolic Collapse

A new year, a new decade, and time again for a fresh set of predictions (and a review of my predictions for 2009), as well as a few thoughts on goals and plans for the new year:

First a review of last year's predictions--a year I labeled as "Selfishness Disguised."  It is with mixed feelings that I report that my 2009 predictions were far more accurate than those for 2008 (though my one "go out on a limb" prediction of a military coup in Pakistan didn't materialize).

In general, my prediction that the economy would muddle along but not officially "recover" in 2009 seems to have been just about right (and, given my general pessimism on the fate of our current political and economic system, it was somewhat bold from my perspective, in late 2008, to not predict collapse and catastrophe).

Similarly, I think I was fairly accurate when I said that the American government would focus all of its energies on solving our short term problems at the expense of putting any real effort into fixing our long-term concerns.  Admittedly, this is probably a safe prediction to make for any group, anywhere, at any time.  None the less, it came to pass.  We've set ourselves up for a bit of a crunch, but more on this later...

Regarding oil prices, I predicted the year ending between $60-$70 a barrel, and in actuality it ended just shy of $80.  There have been many reasons for the surge in prices over the past few days--I've even heard some people claim that the price rise (from around $70 a week before the end of the year) has been due to thin trading--i.e. not enough speculators in the market.  That's a bit too rich even for my tastes:  make up your mind, people who don't think that oil prices are set by supply and demand, is it too many speculators or too few !?  The real story in the current price of oil--not the high resolution $79 vs. $75/barrel, but the fact that oil isn't at $30/barrel--is that the economy hasn't collapsed, and demand has begun to grow again, especially in places like China and India.

On the geopolitics front, I'm disappointed to say that my predictions were correct that Obama would eschew any long-term investment in diplomacy and building institutions for international governance and human rights in favor of various short-term, politically expedient moves: "Surge, Part Deux" in Afghanistan, omens of growing involvement in Yemen, the failure to make any significant effort at the recent Copenhagen conference to show the world that we're not trying to maintain a de facto North-South divide.  Oh well, no big surprise there, move along...

On to 2010:  the year we commit to catabolic collapse.

It's not that I would have suggested that we would manage to avoid it, but 2010 is the year we commit to Catabolic Collapse--the concept that our civilization will experience a long, slow, and bumpy decline over the next several decades.  We spent 2009 desperately scrambling to fabricate a recovery out of everything we could find in the armament:  loan, stimulus, outright bribes to buy houses or new cars, and even occasionally the attempt to enforce some of the laws that could have limited the excesses that were revealed in 2008.

This short-term focus has created several problems for us.  First, we didn't really do a damn thing about energy.  Lower prices were the result of declining demand (especially in the US, where it was "easy"--e.g. high proportion of high elasticity demand).  Calls for real change in energy efficiency standards or renewable energy generation seemed to fade with 3-digit prices just in time to escape being targeted by the "what cooking utensil can we throw now at the problem" approach.  As a result, we're now poised for a short-lived recovery (at least in energy consumption) in the US in 2010, as well as an accelerated rate of energy consumption growth it much of the developing world.  Supplies held relatively steady while the price of oil crashed from nearly $150/barrel to nearly $30 barrel, effectively making any renewable energy investment that depends on oil a more than $30-$40/barrel unlikely on the economics alone.  Likewise, from a political standpoint, far too many think that oil prices spiked because of speculators.  As a result, the political will to address price volatility (such as with a significant gas tax redirecting energy to renewables investment) and proactively avert market-driven demand destruction as supplies decline has evaporated.  At best, we have five years of a relative production plateau (that is only if all megaproject predictions pan out), and then we're in for production decline--I don't see anything in 2010 that will show our intent to build the foundation of renewable generation we'll need to avoid the Renewables Gap and be in any way prepared for the downslope of fossil fuel production...

Where does this leave us for 2010:  I think we'll actually turn the corner from "muddling" to "recovery" in 2010.  I won't be a very egalitarian form of recovery--especially if you are a formerly well paid industrial worker that still captures the attention of the American news media, but there will be a bit of life breathed into the markets for houses and cars, and the results will be another confrontation between energy supply and demand.  Some locales will address this directly, and there will be some real improvements in energy efficiency and the creation of local self-sufficiency, but the reality of energy descent will begin to cut the legs out from underneath any generalized increase in prosperity shortly--perhaps not in 2010, but not long thereafter.  I'd expect another economic slowdown to begin at the end of 2010 as oil prices break and hold just over $100/barrel by the end of the year after an earlier dip (voila, there's my oil price prediction . . . though I'm less bullish for 2011).

The bigger picture, though, is that centralized government seems structurally incapable of mustering the political and economic program necessary to seriously re-evaluate and address how it attempts to order our civilization.  What will happen instead--perhaps as early as the end of 2010, is that we'll again mobilize in support of some near-term and media friendly rallying cry to solve the ___ problem (probably energy, but hell, it could be crime, healthcare, trade wars, blackouts, even piracy for all we know).  The focus on the effervescent economic recovery of 2010 will repeat the general cycle--rally the populace around the promise that-near term recovery is possible, and that we don't need to listen to the loonies advocating for fundamental changes. It is this process that confirms a future of Catabolic Collapse.  Probably driven by energy, but with political and social swings exacerbating the situation as populists of all stripes try to offer their own rallying cries, we'll see the continued degradation of both modernity (to the extent it still exists in the Nation-State construct) and the unabated slide down the energy descent amusement ride.

I can't say I find this prediction particularly distressing, precisely because I think the potential of Rhizome and the Diagonal Economy depend on a collapse that isn't too fast to do anything about (asteroid), too slow to recognize, but just right...  Many will lament the losses of time-honored institutions, but frankly I don't think any centralized and hierarchal powers structure can address the Problem of Growth.  We'll have to do that for ourselves.

I don't have any bold "this specific event will happen here" predictions for 2010, but I do want to give one location-specific example of where I think this trend toward the degradation of the Nation-State construct will be especially severe:  India.  No, I don't think India will collapse (though there will be plenty of stories of woe), nor that the state government that occupies most of the geographic territory of "India" will collapse (note that careful wording).  Rather, I think that the trend for a disconnection between any abstract notion of "Nation" and a unitary state in India will become particularly pronounced  over the course of 2010.  This is already largely apparent in India, but look for it to become more so.  While Indian business and economy will fare decently well in 2010 from an international trade perspective, the real story will be a rising failure of this success to be effectively distributed by the government outside of a narrow class of urban middle class.  It will instead be a rising connectivity and self-awareness of their situation among India's rural poor, resulting in an increasing push for localized self-sufficiency and resiliency of food production (especially the "tipping" of food forests and perennial polycultures), that will most begin to tear at the relevancy of India's central state government.  In India there is a great potential for the beginnings of the Diagonal Economy to emerge in 2010.

Those are my predictions.  Nothing really incredible, but that' the point:  the most important thing that will happen in 2010 (and that almost no one will recognize) is that we will confirm the inability of our most important institutions (Nation-States, centralized economic systems, cultural constructs like "nation") to do anything about the underlying Problem of Growth, or even to take a reasonably long-sighted approach to energy policy and geopolitics.  And, as a result, 2010 will be the year that we commit to the catabolic collapse.

On a slightly lighter note, I'll post briefly about my personal goals and plans for 2010.  I'll gloss over the more personal ones (continue and expand my old-form Chen Taichi practice, read to my daughters every night, shift to an 80% work schedule to allow more time for writing, etc.) in favor of something that might be of interest to readers.  Specifically, my overarching goal is to cultivate mindfulness in 2010--not merely the narrow concept of internal mindfulness, but an expanded notion that includes awareness of all my life choices and how they create or support certain power structures, how they build or diminish hierarchy, and ultimately lead to self-sufficiency and fulfillment of human ontogeny.  In short, my concept of Rhizome is predicated on the structural self-awareness of its participants, and this kind of "life awareness" seems like a valuable skill to work on in my own life.  I also hope to complete a second book, that is now only in very rough outline, providing a stand-alone critique of hierarchy, discussing the Problem of Growth, and offering an alternative via Rhizome and the Diagonal Economy.  More on that as the project progresses...

Happy New Year.

Rhizome is published every Monday morning.  You can subscribe to this blog's RSS feed at:  http://www.jeffvail.net/rss.xml

Resilient Suburbia (TOC)

Here is a consolidated table of contents to my four-part series, "Resilient Suburbia?":

1.  Resilient Suburbia:  Sunk Costs and Credit Markets (also at The Oil Drum)

2.  Resilient Suburbia:  Cost of Commuting (also A Resilient Suburbia? 2: Cost of Commuting)

3.  Resilient Suburbia:  Weighing the Potential for Self-Sufficiency  (also at The Oil Drum)

4.  Resilient Suburbia:  Accounting for the Value of Decentralization (also at The Oil Drum)

This series primarily analyzes the standard Peak Oil critique of suburbia--that it is unsustainable and will collapse.  While I agree with this insofar as we conceptualize suburbia as a static thing, this series also challenges that notion and points to the significant (perhaps even trailblazing) potential for suburbia to adapt to future challenges.  In that sense, it should be read in conjunction with my Diagonal Economy series, which is a much more detailed account of exactly how we can build a vibrant and sustainable civilization despite energy descent (and how Suburbia can play a significant and positive role in this transition).

Rhizome is published every Monday morning.  You can subscribe to this blog's RSS feed at:  http://www.jeffvail.net/rss.xml